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Comment Dante B. Canlas
The Doi, Ihori, and Mitsui chapter (DIM henceforth) takes oﬀ from some
down-to-earth facts about the Japanese government’s budget deﬁcits and
the existing maturity structure of its bonds and other government debt pa-
pers. The backdrop is the collapse of the so-called bubble economy in the
early 1990s, the aftermath of which has been a prolonged economic slump
marked by modest and spotty episodes of recoveries.
The authors attempt to assess the sustainability of Japan’s debt policy by
using the theory of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy to assess the story
behind the government’s actual ﬁscal policy choices. From the perspective
of a class of models that shares this theoretical platform, the writers try to
extract a consistent set of eﬃciency and welfare principles that could oﬀer
guidelines about the future conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The usual starting point for the theory that is put to work in the DIM
chapter is a government that consumes ﬁxed amounts of goods and ser-
vices. Prices and quantities are determined competitively. At some point in
time, the ﬁscal authority may decide to increase the existing pattern of gov-
ernment spending to be ﬁnanced not by a tax increase but by issuance of
government debt. This debt may be in the form of interest-bearing bonds
or noninterest bearing money. In this setting, the ﬁscal authority deter-
mines the level of the public debt while the monetary authority, the com-
position of that debt. The degree of independence enjoyed by the monetary
authority from the ﬁscal authority largely determines whether an income
tax at some future date or an inﬂation tax ﬁnances the budget deﬁcit.
Theoretically, one can assume, following Frank Ramsey’s (1928) canon-
ical growth model, the presence of a central planner, with the ﬁscal and
monetary authorities viewed as acting in a cooperative way. Both authori-
ties take their cue from the central planner who maximizes a social welfare
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straints posed by the existing production technology and the government
budget. The constrained maximization yields the eﬃciency and optimality
principles that in principle could also be delivered by a system of compet-
itive markets with rational ﬁrms and consumers guided by a decentralized
price system. The equilibrium situation may be described, using Robert
Lucas’s words (1986, 117–34), as an “evenly rotating system” through time,
where price ratios adjusted for the given tax rates equal the ratios of the
marginal rates of substitution for all the commodities taken pairwise. In
case the ﬁscal and monetary authorities do not cooperate, then the situa-
tion may be modeled as a game wherein the players behave strategically;
multiple equilibria may result, some of which are not Pareto optimal.
Today, there is a large body of aggregative theoretical models that may
be regarded as extensions or modiﬁcations of the theory of optimal ﬁscal
and monetary policy that I have just roughly described. I would regard the
DIM chapter, which presents a number of interrelated models, as belong-
ing to this genre. For example, let me draw attention to the ﬁrst model of
debt management that the authors present in section 11.3.2. The model
imagines a world with households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority, and a monetary
authority. Households supply labor and form labor unions that possess
wage-setting powers. The writers then posit a well-behaved production
technology and a short-run aggregate supply function similar to that of
Robert Lucas (1973). The two authorities act in a cooperative manner and
behave so that a social loss function is minimized subject to the various
constraints that the agents in the model confront. Eﬃciency and optimal-
ity conditions, perhaps second-best, governing inﬂation, tax rates, and
government purchases are derived.
I would like to raise two questions in relation to this basic lead-oﬀmodel
of the DIM chapter. One, does it succeed in deriving a uniﬁed and consis-
tent set of welfare-theoretic principles? I have some doubts and I hope the
authors can help me out of my quandary. While the ﬁrst-order conditions
may be precise enough, I’m not sure about the propositions or intuitions
the authors oﬀer. Consider, for instance, their statement on maintaining
“the neutrality of bonds toward social welfare (social loss).” It is unclear
whether this is a proposition that ﬂows out of their ﬁrst-order conditions
or is merely an expression of opinion.
The concerns that I have about the basic DIM model may be products of
my own severe bounded-rationality aﬄiction. The authors have assembled
a seemingly hybrid model that combines insights from some celebrated
papers, both descriptive and normative, on optimal ﬁscal (e.g., taxation,
public debt management) and monetary policy. But major diﬀerences in
the analytical frameworks of these papers exist; it would not do to pick one
principle here and another there, and still hope to produce a uniﬁed and
mutually consistent set of principles. For example, if tax smoothing is the
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across time and across states of nature. But suppose debt ﬁnancing using
money prevails; then the inﬂation tax may have to be followed by an in-
come tax (or consumption tax) to try to induce a rate of deﬂation that re-
stores the value of people’s cash balances in real terms. Time inconsistency
results as the constant tax rate is abandoned at some future date.
My second and ﬁnal question is this: do the eﬃciency and optimality
conditions oﬀer useful guides for the actual conduct of ﬁscal and monetary
policy in Japan? In the concluding part of the chapter, the authors suggest
a smoothing rule. The mechanics of the proposed rule have to be spelled
out in detail. Moreover, the authors have to go beyond saying, “it is indis-
pensable to restrain the increasing trend of reliance on government debts.”
Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have known this all along. Why? Will
the Japanese, particularly, the elderly, not willingly hold those bonds any-
more? At the most rudimentary level, some quantitative estimates of the
eﬀects of alternative modes of debt ﬁnancing on the consumption and sav-
ing behavior of Japanese would be of help in this regard.
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